Abstract-Sahai and Waters introduced a fuzzy id-based encryption (FIBE) scheme in which an identity was viewed as a set of descriptive attributes, and any user with a private key for an identity ID was allowed to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with an identity ID′ , if and only if the identity ID and ID′ were close to each other as measured by the "set overlap" distance metric. After that, Shweta Agrawal, Xavier Boyen, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Panagiotis Voulgaris and Hoeteck Weeto constructed a fuzzy id-based encryption scheme from the hardness of the Learning With Errors ( LWE ) problem. The two schemes both had more longer public and private keys, and it was not very efficient. This paper gives more efficient fuzzy id-based encryption scheme from lattice, in which the public keys are greatly reduced, and there are two vectors corresponding to each bit of the identity by using of the algorithm Sampleleft introduced by Shweta Agrawal, Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen, and only a trapdoor basis is the secret key. Furthermore, the scheme is dealing with N bit − information and is also secure from the hardness of the Learning With Errors ( LWE ) problem, and all these greatly raise efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sahai and Waters [1] introduced the concept of fuzzy id-based encryption schemes in 2005, in which the identity was viewed as a set of descriptive attributes. In a fuzzy identity-based encryption scheme, a user with the secret key for the identity ID was able to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with the public key ID′ if and only if ID and ID′ were within a certain distance of each other as judged by some metric. Therefore, fuzzy id-based encryption system could allow for a certain amount of error-tolerance in the identities, and it found its extensive applications mainly in two areas, the first was an id-based encryption system that uses biometric identity such as an iris scan, and as that user's identity described by several attributes and then encrypted to the user using their biometric identity. Since biometric measurements were still limited, and noise disturbance was inevitable, the encryption scheme must allow for a certain amount of error-tolerance. The second was attribute-based encryption scheme, in which a user's keys and ciphertexts were labeled with sets of descriptive attributes and a particular key can decrypt a particular ciphertext only if there was a match between the attributes of the ciphertext and the user's keys. Attribute-based encryption scheme got its' greatly development because of its' extensive applications: Two variants of ABE were subsequently proposed: key-policy variant (KP-ABE) of Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters (GPSW) [2] , ciphertext-policy variant (CP-ABE) of Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters (BSW) [3] . Following, in order to make the access structure more expressive, many schemes have been presented [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . Simultaneously, schemes [6, 9, 10, and 11] were devoted to get constant-size ciphertexts.
Starting from the work of Ajtai [12] , a rich variety of cryptographic primitives based on lattices has recently been presented: one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions [12, 13] , public-key encryption schemes [14, 15] , id-based encryption schemes [16, 17, 18, and 19] , trapdoor function [16] and even fully homomorphic encryption [20, 21, and 22] . Why is lattice-based cryptography so attractive? Because lattice-based cryptography is not only as a fallback in case factoring and discrete-log turn out to be easy (which they are on quantum computers) with its generally resistance to quantum attacks, but also the mathematical properties of these objects make them both relatively efficient and flexible to enable the construction of powerful cryptosystems. Research in lattice-based cryptosystems that reduce from the Learning With Errors ( LWE ) hardness assumption has been particularly active, in no small part because the average-case LWE problem is itself reducible [15, 23] from a slew of worst-case lattice problems, for a sound foundation.
The concept of fuzzy id-based encryption scheme was given in 2005 by Sahai and Waters [1] , who also gave the first fuzzy id-based encryption scheme, which got extensive application. After the work of Ajtai [12] , A rich variety of cryptographic primitives based on lattices have been presented, and Agrawal et al [24] presented a fuzzy id-based encryption scheme from lattice, in which there were two lattices corresponding to each bit of the identity, and the public and private keys were more longer.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The first two are the definition and security model of fuzzy id-based encryption, and the following are the useful algorithms and hardness assumption.
A. Definition1.[1]
A fuzzy id-based encryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
-Fuzzy.Setup ( 
B. Security Model of Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption
We adopt the selective identity secure model for fuzzy id-based encryption introduced by Sahai and Waters [1] , but the difference is that the model is adapted for the random oracle model. Target: The adversary declares the challenge identity * id that he wishes to be challenged upon. Setup: The challenger runs the algorithm of fuzzy idbased encryption and gives the public key to the adversary.
Random Oracle Queries: The adversary is allowed to query the random oracle for some bit strings, and the same bit string is responded to the same oracle.
Secret Key Queries: The adversary is allowed to issue queries for private keys for identity j id of its choice, as long as
Challenge: The adversary sends two equal length messages 
More Secret Key Queries:
The adversary may make more secret key queries subjecting to the requirements described above.
Guess:
The adversary outputs a guess b′ . The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined
Definition2. A fuzzy id-based encryption scheme is selective identity secure if there is negligible function ( ) ε λ such that, in the above game, any adversary will succeed with probability at most 1 ( ) 2 ε λ + .
C. Preimage Sampling Functions [16]
Preimage sampling function is given by three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms: TrapGen; SampleDom; SamplePre. A collection of one-way preimage sampling functions (PSFs) satisfies the following:
1. Generating a function with trapdoor: 
D. Algorithm Sampleleft
The algorithm separately appears in [12] and [23] , and the following is the description of algorithm Sampleleft:
On input a rank n matrix A in 
E. Hardness Assumption
The LWE (learning with errors) problem was first defined by [15] , and has been extensively studied and used. We use the decisional version of the LWE problem. 
III. THE CONCRETE FUZZY ID-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME

A. Concrete Protocol
Let λ be a security parameter, 3. Select N uniform random n -vector 1 2 , , ,
4. Select two uniformly random matrixes 1 ,
5. Output the public parameter and master secret 
, 1,2, , 
B. Correctness and Parameter Declaration
Firstly, we note that
the ciphertext correctly, we can set the parameters with overwhelming probability, so that
IV. ECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the fuzzy IBE scheme is secure against a selective identity attack, and the following is the related theorem:
Theorem 
The adversary sends to B the identity * id that it intends to attack.
-B constructs the system's public parameter PP as follows:
The matrix 0 A is chosen using Ajt99's scheme with a trapdoor 0 T , and the other two matrixes 1 1 , A B are chosen randomly;
The l matrixes 
The vector u is constructed from the LWE
Select l uniformly random vectors 10 More Secret Key Queries: The adversary may make more secret key queries subjecting to the requirements described above.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ that has been encrypted. The adversary is said to succeed if he can correctly identify the encrypted message, i.e. if b b′ = .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give an efficient fuzzy id-based encryption scheme from lattice. Compared with the scheme [24], our scheme has shorter public keys. By using of the algorithm Sampleleft, the secret key is only a trapdoor basis which greatly reduces the complexity of storage on the secret key. Simultaneously, the scheme is dealing with a N -bit message once. Finally, the scheme is also proved secure under the decision version of Learning With Errors ( LWE ). Although the scheme is more efficient, the scheme is secure in the random oracle mode, and the efficient scheme under standard model will be our further research in future.
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